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Abstract 
Changes in the risk structure of stock returns may sometimes be very revealing. 
We examine economic variables that help explain principal components in UK 
stock returns, 01/1985 to 12/2001. The loading pattern on explanatory variables 
for the first component in a ‘bubble’ period is distinctive and consistent with a 
bubble/crash market. The second component shows a loading pattern on a 
Consumer Confidence variable in a pre-bubble period only. We observe 
apparently systematic changes in the structure of risk, and conjecture that 
Consumer Confidence captures a change in market sentiment that could be a 
signal for the evolution of stock prices. 
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Changes in the Risk Structure of Stock Returns: 
Consumer Confidence and the Dotcom Bubble 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we explore the idea that analyzing changes in the risk structure of 
stock returns may sometimes be more fruitful than trying to identify specific 
economic underpinnings of risk. As an example we exploit the natural 
experiment created by the dotcom bubble in the late 1990s and ask whether 
this was characterised by changes in the risk structure of UK stock returns. We 
carry out principal components analyses (PCA) of monthly returns for three sub-
periods between 01/1986 and 12/2000 and examine the loadings of the first and 
second principal components on innovations in explanatory economic variables 
in time series regressions. The loading pattern for the first component in the 
‘bubble/crash’ period is both distinct from the preceding periods and plausibly 
characteristic of a market showing departure from fundamental pricing. While 
the second component shows no strong loading pattern on the explanatory 
variables in either the first or third sub-periods, in the ‘pre-bubble’ period it is 
characterized by significant loadings on a Consumer Confidence variable, 
leading us to conjecture that the changes in risk structure provided signals for 
the evolution of stock prices.  
The relationship between risk and return in equity markets and the status 
of asset pricing models remains unresolved after four decades of debate. Multi-
factor approaches (unlike the CAPM) have the apparent advantage of being 
based on observable sources of risk but there is as yet no satisfactory theory to 
say what these risks are, so they have to be identified empirically. For example, 
in their three-factor model, Fama and French (FF) (1993) use size (SMB) and 
book-to-market (HML) risk factors to explain the cross-section of average 
returns, but can only conjecture that loadings on these factors reflect firm 
profitability. Others (Mei, 1993; Brennan et al., 1998) have focused on size and 
book-to-market ratios as ‘non-risk’ firm-level characteristics. Brennan et al. 
suggest that these attract premia incremental1 to both the FF factors and five 
components of a PCA model. The appellation ‘non-risk’ distinguishes firm 
characteristics from risk factors but the former are still subject to economic 
shocks and may not be wholly diversifiable. In one sense, therefore, a shift of 
focus towards firm characteristics simply moves the old question to a new 
domain – rather than identify the underlying sources of variation in stock returns 
we must now identify them for production, earnings and profitability.  
Since they reflect the business cycle and the international competitive 
environment, macroeconomic variables with potential impact on the discounted 
dividend valuation model of stock prices seem to be attractive candidates as 
sources of risk. Two favoured methods for identifying risk factors in arbitrage 
pricing models have been either to carry out factor analyses of stock returns 
and relate the resulting factors to a selection of variables or to regress stock 
returns directly against pre-selected variables (Chan, et al., 1985; Chen et al., 
1986; Chen and Jordan, 1993; for the US – Beenstock and Chan, 1988; Poon 
and Taylor, 1991; Clare and Thomas, 1994; Priestley, 1996; Antoniou et al., 
1998; for the UK). There are problems of interpretation here since a common 
premise, implicit or explicit, is that the economic variables represent specific 
sources of risk. This may not be reasonable, since it is hard to specify a priori 
the news impact of a shock of given size, to know what the risk implications 
might be or even to know whether the shock constitutes good or bad news for 
investors, because these things depend on the wider social, political and 
economic context. Indeed, Cheng (1996) argues that macroeconomic variables 
can themselves be clustered into common risk factors (again shifting the 
problem of interpretation to a new domain). More generally, even if there are 
strong short-term regularities and patterns, it is very difficult to believe that the 
risk structure of stock returns has real permanence or even that the sources of 
risk themselves remain the same over time2. Are the sources of common risk 
really invariant over periods of international tension and conflict, climate 
change, international terrorism, post-war reconstruction, financial liberalization, 
technological revolution, investment fads, oil shocks, inflation, electioneering3, 
programmed trading, economic transition, and so on?  
It is apparent in the literature that explanatory variables that work in one 
context very often fail to work in another. While it is possible that this can be 
ascribed to particular features of methodology or to sampling differences, we 
argue that if there are continually evolving complex interactions among 
unpredictably shifting sources of risk then any search for their ‘true’ identity may 
yield only short-term results at best. On the other hand, the dynamic nature of 
risk may itself lead to other interesting opportunities. If we can observe 
systematic changes in the pattern of risk (however measured) we may be able 
to enhance the explanatory power of pricing models and reveal signals that 
suggest further patterns of evolution in stock prices. What is more, some of the 
burden of methodology may be relieved, since an instrument sufficient to detect 
meaningful changes in the pattern of risk is unlikely to require the precision of 
one that must identify its ‘true’ underpinnings. 
The stock market bubble of the late 1990s forms a natural experiment in 
which to examine changes in the risk structure of stock returns. In particular we 
are drawn to the idea that a price bubble is unlikely to arise unless there is a 
pre-existing ‘psychological climate’ that allows it. Almost by definition, market 
participants are likely to over-estimate the significance of positive price signals 
in an optimistic climate and under-estimate their significance in a pessimistic 
climate (creating, inter alia, the psychological underpinnings for momentum in 
asset prices). But this begs the question of what it is that creates the market 
sentiment in the first place. Since a market bubble is highly unlikely to be a 
sudden random event without observable pre-cursors it is the evolution of the 
relevant market sentiment that is of particular interest. Indeed, compared to the 
progress of the bubble itself, the evolution of conditions favorable to a bubble 
may be relatively slow. It also seems to us that looking for bubble precursors in 
the time-path of stock prices is problematic, since the bubble and prior stock 
prices are clearly not independent and there is a strong danger of creating a 
circular explanation. A variable is needed that is both measured independently 
of stock prices and likely to capture the evolution of market sentiment. Since 
markets and investors are part of the wider economy, we argue that consumer 
confidence indicators make suitable candidates. 
Our approach differs from other UK studies (Beenstock and Chan, 1988; 
Poon and Taylor, 1991; Clare and Thomas, 1994; Priestley, 1996), all of which 
sought to identify macroeconomic variables attracting risk-premia in cross-
sectional pricing equations. We use a time-series approach similar to that of 
Chen and Jordan (1993) to examine the macroeconomic underpinnings of risk 
factors but we differ by (i) using UK data and (ii) using PCA to extract 
components from individual stock returns instead of factor analysis on portfolios 
of stocks. More important, we differ from all the studies cited above by focusing 
on changes in the pattern of explanatory variables over time rather than seeking 
to identify the ‘true’ economic underpinnings of risk. Finally we differ from all 
other studies of which we are aware by the novel inclusion of a Consumer 
Confidence explanatory variable.  
In the next section we briefly review standard PCA as a method of 
extracting risk factors and in section 3 we describe the data and the design of 
the analysis. We present PCA results in section 4 followed by a discussion in 
section 5 of the results of regressing component scores against the selected 
economic variables. 
2. Risk Factors in Stock Markets and Principal Components Analysis 
 
Arbitrage pricing models have been examined using factor-analytic techniques 
by a number of authors for the US (Roll and Ross, 1980; Chen, 1983; Dhrymes 
et al., 1985a, 1985b; Shukla and Trzcinka, 1990) and the UK (Beenstock and 
Chan, 1986; Abeysekera and Mahajan, 1987; Cheng, 1996).  
Although much of the literature has been focused on factor analysis, 
work by Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) suggests that PCA may be the 
methodology of choice when stock returns are assumed to follow an 
approximate factor structure. In the APM (Ross, 1977) it is assumed that the 
return to asset i, , is generated by a multi-factor process with a strict factor 
structure: 
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Here  is the mean return to asset i while the  are independently 
distributed mean-zero, unit-variance factors with loadings . The  variables 
are uncorrelated with the residual disturbances, , which are themselves 
uncorrelated with each other. The covariance matrix of returns to the N assets, 
, can therefore be partitioned into 
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where  is an NB KN ×  matrix of factor loadings, of rank K, and  is a diagonal 
matrix of finite residual variances. Assuming that no-arbitrage conditions hold 
and that there exists a riskless asset with return 
ND
ρ , a strict factor structure 
implies that the mean return to asset i will be an approximate linear function of 
the factor loadings:  
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If a sufficiently well-diversified portfolio can be formed that the residual risk of 
(1) vanishes then (3) will hold as an equality.  
Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) argue that the assumption of a strict 
factor structure with few factors is too strong, and show that an approximate 
factor structure will also lead to the APM relationship given in (3). Using an 
approximate factor structure the partition given by (2) is re-written as  
  NNNN RBB +′=Σ        (4) 
where for any number of assets, the residual matrix  is a positive semi-
definite matrix with non-zero off-diagonal elements. Chamberlain and 
Rothschild show that the first K eigenvalues of 
NR
NΣ  will increase without bound 
as N increases, with all other eigenvalues being bounded. The partition of NΣ  
given in (4) is unique, with NNBB ′  being obtained from the eigenvectors 
corresponding to the largest K eigenvalues of NΣ . They then argue that it is 
both appropriate and convenient to identify these eigenvalues by using principal 
components analysis. 
In PCA the principal components are written as N linear combinations of 
variables  ( ): ix Ni K1=
        (5) 
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The components have values or ‘component scores’ derived from their loadings 
 on the observations  for each variable i. In what follows, the matrix S can 
be either the covariance or the correlation matrix of the x variables but it must 
be noted that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the components 
extracted in the two cases. In this study we use the correlation matrix because 
using the covariance matrix may (i) cause individual stocks with larger than 
average variances to dominate the first few principal components (Joliffe, 1986) 
and (ii) emphasise sample-specific noise in identifying common sources of risk. 
jib itx
The first component, xb11 ′=c , is chosen to maximise  
subject to the normalisation constraint 
111)( Sbb′=cVar
111 =′bb  (the eigenvectors have unit 
length). The first-order condition with respect to  of the Langrangean 1b
( 111111 −′−′= bbSbb )λL  is given by ( ) 0 11 =− bIS λ . Since a non-trivial solution 
requires 1λ  to satisfy 01 =− IS λ , 1λ  is an eigenvalue of S with associated 
eigenvector . Imposing the normalisation constraint gives 1b 111 Sbb′=λ , 
showing that 1λ  is also the variance of principal component . Since  is 
chosen to maximise this variance it follows that 
1c 1b
1λ  is the largest eigenvalue of 
S. The second principal component is chosen similarly but subject to the 
additional constraint that it is orthogonal to the first. This gives 2λ  as the 
second-largest eigenvalue of S, with eigenvector . The remaining 2b 2−N  
components are chosen analogously. The total variation of the sample is 
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If the covariation in stock returns can be summarised by a small number, K, of 
components, there will be K distinct eigenvalues (and principal components) 
that explain the majority of the variation in S. Chamberlain and Rothschild 
(1983) show (i) that if S has K unbounded eigenvalues there is an approximate 
factor structure that is unique and (ii) that estimates of the K eigenvectors will 
converge.  
The number of significant components, K, is likely to be substantially 
smaller than the number of variables (US cross-sectional studies suggest that 
about three or four risk factors are priced) but identifying this number is likely to 
be complicated by sample-specific random variation, particularly when the PCA 
is carried out on small samples. While tests are available for the number of 
significant components (Connor and Korajczyk, 1993) this is not of concern 
here. We argue instead that if the multi-factor structure of common systematic 
risk has any strong underlying economic meaning then we should be able to 
detect this in the relationship between economic variables and scores on the 
first two or three components, even when using fairly small stock samples.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
In this study, PCA is carried out on groups of UK stocks selected in alphabetical 
order. Patterns in the structure of risk are revealed by regressing component 
scores in time-series against economic variables. Since stock markets are 
presumed to respond to economic news, white noise ‘innovations’ in the 
variables are derived by using the Kalman Filter from STAMP (Koopman et al. 
2000). The relationship between the innovations and component scores is 
established by using the general-to-specific methodology (Hendry, 1995; 
Hendry and Krolzig, 2001) of PcGets (OxMetricsTM).  
While we have argued that changes in socio-economic conditions are 
likely to cause the underlying risk structure of stock markets to change, it is 
implicit in standard PCA that the true component structure is invariant over the 
sample period for which the components are extracted. It is also assumed that 
sufficient stocks are sampled to allow valid inferences to be drawn (Stevens 
(1996) recommends that standard PCA should use at least twice the number of 
observations as variables) leading to an uneasy trade-off between a sufficient 
number of observations and a short enough time period to avoid within-sample 
instabilities in the true component structure. Shorter time periods reduce the 
possible number of sampled stocks, making it necessary to repeat the 
procedures, but replication across many different stock samples should allow 
reasonable inferences to be drawn with respect to the market as a whole.  
The data used here came from a wider sample constructed from stocks 
with histories from 1975 to 2001. Monthly stock returns, adjusted for dividends 
and capital changes, were drawn from the London Business School Share Price 
Database (LSPD). 516 UK stocks showed returns over the entire period. 
Financial companies, investment trusts and stocks with more than 20% missing 
or zero observations were excluded4, resulting in a final sample of 240 
companies and a compromise between reducing a thin-trading problem and 
retaining sufficient stocks for the PCA.  
Inspection of the market index over the full sample period shows that the 
choice of 01/1997 as the starting point for our third sample period represents a 
compromise between the demands of PCA discussed above (which seem to us 
to suggest periods of 5 or 6 years) and other possible ‘bubble’ periods of around 
7 or 3 years (starting either in early 1995 or late 1998). The final choice 
(01/1985 to 12/1990, 01/1991 to 12/1996, 01/1997 to 12/2001) allows the final 
‘bubble’ period to include the major volatility of the later years of the sample 
(and possible departures from fundamental pricing) without extending too far 
the length of any sub-period. The 240 selected stocks were allocated in 
alphabetical order to groups of 24, allowing both sufficient observations for each 
PCA and replication across 10 non-overlapping stock samples. IT stocks are 
not identified separately in our analysis, for three reasons: first, only firms 
trading continuously from 1975 were selected, so IT stocks form a very small 
minority; second, the dotcom bubble affected all stocks; third, given the small 
number of IT stocks, the random allocation of stocks to samples and the high 
degree of replication, there is no reason to suppose that the presence of a few 
IT stocks in the sample creates any systematic effect. Descriptive statistics for 
the samples are given in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Stock Samples 
Period 1985-1990 1991-1996  1997-2001  
MV 
(£bn) 
MV 
(£bn) 
MV 
(£bn) Group R  Beta R  Beta R  Beta
 
1 0.0101 9.15 0.92 0.0151 16.88 0.96 0.0002 19.46 0.91 
2 0.0105 9.13 0.97 0.0119 14.54 0.97 -0.0018 47.44 0.85 
3 0.0082 2.62 1.01 0.0101 5.13 0.99 0.0031 6.65 0.87 
4 0.0127 11.68 0.92 0.0126 27.10 0.94 0.0025 57.85 0.88 
5 0.0107 6.06 0.98 0.0094 8.00 1.04 -0.0008 8.77 0.90 
6 0.0103 3.98 0.88 0.0094 7.60 0.91 0.0054 8.73 0.85 
7 0.0110 5.02 0.92 0.0099 9.52 1.00 0.0027 16.47 0.93 
8 0.0105 9.43 0.97 0.0121 18.91 0.97 0.0007 33.66 0.91 
9 0.0126 4.28 0.93 0.0119 10.25 0.99 0.0012 16.72 0.93 
10 0.0131 2.18 0.85 0.0102 4.97 0.85 0.0037 8.41 0.81 
Mean 0.0110 6.35 0.94 0.0113 12.29 0.96 0.0017 22.41 0.88 
The table shows average returns, average market capitalisation and average beta for each 
sample group (data from the London Share Price Database). 
 
It is evident that average returns are lower for the ‘bubble’ period (as a result of 
the eventual crash) with betas fairly close to unity in most cases (with a narrow 
spread). There is some heterogeneity in market capitalisation across groups 
and sub-periods but this does not produce any systematic effects in the results. 
The PCA was repeated for each group of stocks and each period, 
producing a large number of principal components, eigenvalues and loadings. 
Adapting from expression (5) we can derive scores for the K principal 
components from the estimated component loadings, , and the monthly 
stock returns for each stock sample (
gkib
) and each month, t: 101K=g
  .       (7) ∑
=
=
n
i
itgkigkt Rbc
1
The PcGets General Unrestricted Model (GUM) for each group is given by  
       (8) it
H
h
htgkhggkt zc εγγ ++= ∑
=1
0
where  is the score for the kth component of stock sample g in month t, and 
 is the observation for macroeconomic innovation h (
gktc
Hh K1= ). htz
 
The Economic Variables 
Here we follow both traditional practice and published empirical findings (Chen 
et al., 1986; Chen and Jordan, 1993; Poon and Taylor, 1991; Clare and 
Thomas, 1994; Priestley, 1996) to select macroeconomic variables thought to 
influence either expected dividends ( )tDE  or the discount rate R of the stock 
valuation model: 
∑∞
= +
=
1
0
)1(
)(
t
t
t
R
DE
P  .       (9) 
The selected variables are shown in Table 2. We include the UK FTA All Share 
index and its Dividend Yield since the market index return is a generally 
powerful explanatory variable in time-series factor models and its exclusion 
could lead to omitted variables bias (we are also interested in the incremental 
impact on component scores from other sources of economic news).  
 
Table 2. Economic Variables 
Variable Innovation 
Industrial Production I 
Unemployment Rate U 
Retail Price Index P 
Money Supply M0 S 
UK Retail Sales R 
FT All Share Index  M 
FT All Share Index Dividend Yield Y 
US$ Exchange Rate X 
Reuters Commodity Price Index Co 
Oil Price (£) O 
Gold Price (£) G 
20-Year Gilts Redemption Yield (Gilts)  
3 Month UK TBill Yield (TBill)  
UK Corporate Debenture and Loan Redemption Yield (Corp)  
D Default Risk (Gilts − TBill) 
T Term Spread (Gilts − Corp) 
UK Consumer Confidence Indicator C 
 
In addition to variables commonly selected in other studies, and following the 
motivation outlined in the introduction, we include a Consumer Confidence 
indicator. Chen et al. (1986) note that explanations of systematic risk should 
include any variables “necessary to complete the description of the state of 
nature” and that an example “would be one that has no direct influence on 
current cash flows but that does describe the changing investment opportunity 
set” (p384). Consumer confidence indicators that are intended to measure 
expectations seem to be a case in point, with various studies finding evidence 
of a relationship between these indicators and stock returns (Otoo, 1999; Fisher 
and Statman, 2002; Jansen and Nahuis, 2003). They also have the advantage 
of being constructed entirely independently of the macroeconomic series and of 
stock prices. Thus, the UK consumer confidence indicator is a composite of 
survey responses concerning expectations of the general economic situation 
and household financial position, perceptions of how these have changed over 
the last twelve months and views on major household purchases. If the risk 
structure of stock returns is sensitive to changes in the wider socio-economic 
context it seems to us highly plausible that this should be indicated by effects 
arising through indicators of this sort. 
While our other variables are expected to have an impact on the 
valuation of cash flows they are also intended to capture the business cycle and 
required risk premia (Industrial production, unemployment, retail prices, money 
supply, retail sales, term spread and default risk) as well as portfolio balance 
(market capital gain and dividend yield, commodity prices, oil and gold prices, 
exchange rate). Data for all explanatory variables are drawn from Datastream. 
Since only unexpected changes in the variables are of importance 
(‘news’), innovations were derived in every case by applying the Kalman Filter 
to the raw series – a technique that seen increasing use in recent years 
(Priestley, 1996; Cauchie et al., 2004). Using STAMP, white noise residuals (the 
innovations) were generated by either an unobserved components model or (if 
this produced autocorrelated residuals) an autoregressive model with time-
varying parameters. A detailed presentation of the Kalman filter is to be found in 
Harvey (1989), with brief details in Priestley (1996). The time series of the raw 
variables and the Kalman filter residuals are shown in Figures 1 and 2 
respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Raw Macroeconomic Variables 01/1985 to 12/2001 
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Figure 2. Kalman Filter Innovations 01/1985 to 12/2001 
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4. PCA Results 
The full matrix of PCA results is quite large, so only the main results are given. 
Table 3 shows the incremental percent of total variation explained by the first 
three principal components. Table 4 shows the numbers of principal 
components with eigenvalues greater than unity and the percentage of total 
variation they explain.  
Table 3. Percent of Variation Explained by Three Principal Components 
  
Component Period Stock Sample Groups 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
PC1 85-90 45 43 47 42 45 39 41 48 44 33 
PC2  6 6 6 8 6 7 6 6 7 7 
PC3  5 6 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 6 
PC1 91-96 32 28 30 31 30 29 31 33 36 26 
PC2  12 7 8 8 7 9 8 8 9 6 
PC3  7 8 6 7 6 6 7 6 6 6 
PC1 97-01 23 22 24 24 25 24 24 24 26 21 
PC2  11 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 10 
PC3  7 8 8 7 8 8 8 8 7 8 
 (Rounded to whole numbers) 
Table 4. Numbers of Components with Eigenvalues Greater than Unity, 
and Percent of Total Variation Explained  
 
Period Stock Sample Groups 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
85-90 5 (64) 5 (64) 5 (67) 5 (65) 5 (67) 6 (65) 7 (71) 4 (64) 5 (66) 6 (61) 
91-96 6 (66) 8 (69) 7 (65) 7 (66) 8 (64) 7 (65) 6 (62) 7 (67) 6 (66) 8 (64) 
97-01 8 (69) 9 (71) 7 65) 8 (68) 9 (74) 8 (67) 8 (68) 9 (69) 8 (69) 8 (67) 
 (% values in brackets, rounded to whole numbers) 
From Tables 3 and 4 it is evident that the first component captures as much of 
the total variation as the second and third components combined and 
sometimes very much more (four times as much in the extreme case). 
However, the percent explained by the second and third components is not 
negligible (averaging 7 or 8% in each case).  
 The individual stock loadings on a principal component convey very little 
information and there is a very strong chance that they will capture sample-
specific variation – (i.e. individual stock loadings have little economic 
significance). We therefore investigate the economic underpinnings of the 
overall component scores to see if any systematic explanatory patterns can be 
observed, with replication over different stock samples. 
5. Regression of Economic Variables on Component Scores 
The 10 sample groups provide 10 non-overlapping replications on stocks that 
should only be related via common sources of variation in returns. Similarity in 
the results across samples therefore suggests significant robustness of the 
conclusions with respect to both the methodology and any identified sources of 
risk. Our PCA results suggest that maybe three principal components are 
required to capture a substantial proportion of market risk, while cross-sectional 
studies suggest that about three to five risk factors may earn premia in the UK 
market. If these risk factors are indeed related to macroeconomic variables (as 
the cited studies have suggested) then this relationship should be revealed 
here. In particular, we might expect specific patterns of macroeconomic 
variables to be associated with particular principal components.  
 Since the market model generally describes any time series of stock 
returns reasonably well, we might expect Market Capital Gain (M) and Dividend 
Yield (Y) to be significant explanatory variables for the first principal component 
and for this to capture most of the systematic variation in the returns. Since a 
price rise will generate a positive return but a decrease in dividend yield (unless 
dividends are increased in proportion) we also expect M and Y to have positive 
and negative influences respectively on the scores for the first component.  
 Our null hypotheses are that: (i) regression analysis yields the same 
results for all 30 sample groups (the risk structure is invariant over time and 
across stock samples); (ii) the first component is explained by Market Capital 
Gain and Dividend Yield; (iii) the second and subsequent components are 
explained by other patterns of macroeconomic variables. Our alternative 
hypotheses are based on two considerations. First, Fama and French (1993) 
note that a much wider spread of betas is observed when the excess market 
return is used alone in time series regressions than when used in conjunction 
with their SMB and HML factors (when the market betas all move closer to 
unity). This suggests that the market return used alone is also likely to capture 
sources of risk otherwise represented by the SMB and HML factors. If the latter 
are driven by variation in earnings and profitability, as FF conjecture, we might 
expect to find additional explanatory contributions to the first principal 
component from the remaining variables (insofar as these affect cash flows). 
Second, since we conjecture that the structure of risk varies with changes in the 
wider socio-economic context, we expect distinct patterns of significant 
variables in the various principal components for the bubble and pre-bubble 
periods, involving Consumer Confidence in particular.  
Consumer Confidence should capture the aggregation of information contained 
in other variables (the wider economic context) into the economic expectations 
of individuals. The ‘sentiment’ of the market should in turn be the systematic 
influence on stock prices represented the aggregation of these individual 
expectations. It is not clear a priori whether Consumer Confidence should 
reflect the immediate or the future mood of the market, but both are possible. 
Thus, in the absence of a formal model of the aggregation of individual 
economic optimism into market sentiment, Consumer Confidence could emerge 
as an additional explanatory variable in any principal component (including the 
first component). Since it is measured independently of stock prices (and all 
other economic variables) we might also expect it to be the dominant 
explanatory variable in its ‘own’ principal component. Further, if investor 
sentiment (as measured by Consumer Confidence) evolves gradually over time, 
and is at least partly independent of stock prices, we should expect changes in 
the representation of Consumer Confidence over time.  
Our alternative hypotheses are necessarily rather vague because, as far as we 
are aware, there is as yet neither a suitable formal model for aggregating 
Consumer Confidence into market sentiment nor any suitable formal structural 
model for clustering economic variables into sources of systematic risk. 
However, we propose as alternative hypotheses: (i) in addition to Market Capital 
Gain and Dividend Yield, other economic variables and Consumer Confidence 
may underpin the first principal component; (ii) Consumer Confidence is an 
independent systematic influence on stock prices; (iii) patterns of explanatory 
economic variables change over time in any principal component. 
 In the general-to-specific approach to economic modelling, a general 
unrestricted model (GUM) is formulated from the theoretical and empirical 
framework under consideration (in our case the relations between economic 
innovations and principal components). The GUM is automatically simplified by 
PcGets to a parsimonious congruent model containing individually significant 
regressors, with each simplification stage being checked automatically by the 
diagnostic testing procedures of the programme. The ‘black box’ features of 
PcGets might seem questionable in some circumstances but, because they 
remove any possibility of subjectivity in the final selection of variables, they 
seem to us to be highly desirable for any research design involving replication. 
In our view, this substantially increases the robustness of the results. 
The final models derived from the general-to-specific modeling procedure 
are shown in Table 5. This has been made more readable by identifying 
significant coefficients by letter and removing all non-significant coefficients 
(significance level set at 5%). Very few significant variables and no systematic 
patterns of any kind were observed for the third principal component, so results 
are reported for the first two components only. The first two columns of the table 
are reserved for Market Capital Gain (M) and Dividend Yield (Y) while other 
variables are positioned so as to maximize the visual impact of any pattern. 
F-tests confirm the joint significance of the coefficients in every case for 
which either the initial GUM of equation (8) or an encompassing model is 
supported. Cases in which irrelevant variables are eliminated but no superior 
encompassing model can be found are denoted in Table 5 by the entry ‘Yes’. 
The entry ‘YES’ indicates that a superior encompassing model can be found 
while ‘Yes*’ indicates ‘YES’ plus a significant intercept. The remaining category 
(NO) shows that the initial GUM was not significant. 
Negative coefficients are flagged by (-). Inspecting for overall systematic 
patterns of significance among the individual variables reveals that Market 
Capital Gain (M), Dividend Yield (Y), Consumer Confidence (C), Retail Sales 
(R) and the Gold Price (G) may have some impact on the time series of returns. 
Of the remaining variables none occur with sufficient regularity across the 30 
replications for any conclusions to be drawn.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Significant Variables in the Regression of Component Scores on 
Economic Innovations  
 
 
PERIOD 1985-1990 
Group First  PC R2 Gets Second PC R2 Gets 
1 M Y- G-    0.874 YES        NO 
2 M Y-     0.829 YES     G-  0.081 YES 
3 M Y-    X 0.866 YES      U- 0.055 YES 
4 M Y-    O- 0.895 YES M- Y-    I 0.245 YES 
5 M Y-     0.870 Yes     G-  0.067 YES 
6 M Y- G-    0.843 YES      P- 0.079 YES 
7 M Y-     0.835 YES M- Y-     0.119 YES 
8 M Y-     0.877 YES M- Y-     0.192 YES 
9 M Y- G-    0.855 YES        NO 
10 M Y- G- U- C Co 0.846 YES 
 
M- Y-  R-   0.191 YES 
PERIOD 1991-1996 
Group First  PC R2 Gets  Second PC R2 Gets 
1 M      0.682 YES M  C- R-   0.295 YES 
2 M Y-     0.623 YES      U- 0.062 YES 
3 M Y-  U   0.682 YES M-  C    0.164 YES 
4 M Y- G-    0.751 YES   C-    0.178 YES 
5 M      0.565 YES M-  C    0.217 YES 
6 M Y-     0.686 YES M Y    T 0.225 YES 
7 M Y-     0.685 YES M-  C    0.236 YES 
8 M Y-  U  T 0.746 YES M  C-    0.242 Yes 
9 M Y-     0.821 Yes* M  C-    0.294 YES 
10 M    C  0.414 YES 
 
       NO 
PERIOD 1997-2001 
Group First  PC R2 Gets Second PC R2 Gets 
1 M     X- 0.486 YES        NO 
2 M  R    0.409 YES M     D 0.135 YES 
3 M  R    0.382 YES  Y     0.096 YES 
4 M      0.451 YES    R G-  0.229 YES 
5 M      0.315 Yes      S- 0.091 YES 
6 M      0.366 YES        NO 
7 M  R   P 0.539 YES   C    0.151 YES 
8 M      0.465 YES   C    0.064 YES 
9 M      0.580 YES    R   0.069 Yes 
10 M  R    0.440 YES 
 
 Y    O 0.159 YES 
 
Key  
All listed variables are significant at the 5% level or better. 
See Table 2 for the key to variable letter codes. 
Gets: YES – final encompassing model found; Yes – final encompassing model found with 
significant constant term; No – irrelevant variables eliminated but no superior encompassing 
model found. NO – the GUM is insignificant.  
 
For the first principal component a satisfactory model with generally high  is 
found
2R
5 in all 20 cases for the first two periods. Here the time series of 
component scores is strongly explained by M and Y(-) with weak support in the 
first period from the Gold Price G(-). While these results in isolation seem to 
support the null hypothesis, the results for the final period are quite different and 
are consistent with a market showing departures from fundamental valuation. 
Here dividend yield drops out completely and the component score is driven in 
half of the groups by Market Capital Gain alone. The emergence of a weak 
Retail Sales (R) effect in some groups can perhaps be explained by traders 
overweighting sales signals when looking for confirmation of exaggerated 
expectations (optimistic or pessimistic) during a bubble/crash period, but the 
influence of this variable is restricted to only 4 of the 10 groups. The values of 
 are generally lower in this period (suggesting that the model is less 
explanatory) and the significance of M is reduced (though it remains very 
strong). There are no obvious patterns of significance among the remaining 
variables and their presence probably reflects sample-specific noise. There is 
evidently a strongly replicated pattern of explanatory variables for the first 
component that distinguishes the final ‘bubble’ period from the prior periods. In 
addition, it appears that the first component is not explained solely by the 
combination of M and Y in any period. The null hypotheses are therefore not 
supported. 
2R
 With respect to the second component, while the values of  are much 
lower and the Gets algorithm fails to support an explanatory model for 5 of the 
30 regressions, the results nonetheless show some interesting features. For the 
‘bubble’ period the second component shows no systematic pattern 
whatsoever, suggesting that systematic risk in the market was dominated by the 
first component alone (this seems consistent with, for example, a market driven 
by psychological forces such as momentum). For the first period, while M(-) and 
Y(-) emerge as explanatory variables in 4 out of 10 samples this is weak 
replication to which it is difficult to ascribe strong economic significance. In 
marked contrast, for the pre-bubble period the second principal component 
results are quite striking: (i) although they are still rather low, the values of  
are generally higher than the other periods (ii) there is a strong joint contribution 
of M and Consumer Confidence (C) (significant in 7 out of 10 replications) and 
(iii) M and C always have opposite signs (so the fact that neither variable has 
constant sign across groups is probably not of any great concern). We therefore 
see sharp systematic changes over time in the pattern of explanatory variables 
for the second component, apparently related to Consumer Confidence.  
2R
2R
In view of our general conjecture that the risk structure of stock returns 
varies over time to reflect changes in the wider socio-economic context, it is not 
particularly surprising to find that the dotcom bubble is reflected in the 
underpinnings of principal components. The view that periods of high volatility 
(bubbles and crashes) are characterised by departures from fundamental asset 
pricing seems to be supported by our results – in the bubble period (with 
subsequent crash) the first component is dominated by a single market force 
while the second component is not explained by any of our variables.  
The general non-significance of the macroeconomic variables is 
somewhat surprising, considering the significant risk premia that have been 
found elsewhere in UK cross-sectional studies. While this may arise from using 
small stock samples to generate the principal components, it seems to us that 
an economic variable that cannot easily be detected as a source of risk is 
probably not very important. Much more important, in our view, is that our 
procedures seem to have identified interesting changes in the pattern of risk 
during the ‘natural experiment’ of the dotcom bubble and crash. Of these 
results, the most interesting is the strong emergence of Consumer Confidence 
as an explanatory variable. While we expected this variable to reflect investor 
sentiment in a changing economic environment, we did not really expect the 
impact to be quite so sharply demarcated (pre-bubble period and second 
component only). Given that the principal components are orthogonal, and that 
the first component is, as expected, dominated by the actual market return, it is 
perfectly reasonable to suppose that an evolution of market sentiment would be 
detected by the second component – that is, during the pre-bubble period the 
gradual evolution of market sentiment and the behavior of the market index 
itself were measured independently. During the bubble period, however, we 
speculate that consumer confidence was directly translated into stock market 
sentiment, making it impossible to disentangle consumer confidence, market 
sentiment and the behavior of the market index, leading to the predominant 
importance of Market Capital Gain as the only clear explanatory variable and to 
the apparent departure from fundamental pricing.  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated the time pattern of risk in the UK stock 
market, as revealed by changes in the relationship between the principal 
components of stock returns and macro-economic ‘news’ (innovations in 
variables related to portfolio balance, fundamental pricing and the business 
cycle). Under the assumption that bubbles in asset prices require the prior 
evolution of a favorable climate of expectations, we examined progression in 
the structure of risk over three sub-periods, including a dotcom bubble period, 
using a UK Consumer Confidence indicator to capture the development of 
market sentiment. The principal components analysis and the subsequent 
regressions were also subjected to replication in 10 non-overlapping stock 
samples (making 30 replications in all) using stocks with continuous data from 
1975. While three components appeared to have possible significance in the 
PCA only the first two showed any systematic relationship to the chosen 
economic variables. Of these, only Market Capital Gain, Dividend Yield and 
Consumer Confidence revealed any real explanatory power. The first principal 
component was explained by Market Capital Gain with general support from 
Dividend Yield in the first two sub-periods, as expected. Unsurprisingly, in the 
bubble period there appeared to be a departure from fundamental pricing with 
innovations in Market Capital Gain emerging as the only strong explanatory 
variable. Analysis of the second principal component also revealed strong 
systematic effects. In particular, Consumer Confidence emerged as strongly 
explanatory in the pre-bubble period, leading us to speculate that this period 
saw the evolution of a sentiment that pre-disposed markets to bubble. All these 
results were strongly robust with respect to replication across non-overlapping 
samples. 
We have argued that the investigation of changes in risk structure is likely to be 
more fruitful than any search for the ‘true’ underpinnings of risk, speculating that 
these changes contain information signaling the future pattern of stock prices. 
Such speculation is admittedly strong and ultimately demands a suitable model 
of behavioral finance in which investor sentiment can both accumulate over time 
and aggregate into a dynamic macroeconomic influence on stock prices.  
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1 Mei (1993) finds that size and dividend yield effects are captured by his PCA model but that 
book-to-market and E/P ratio effects are not. More recently, Avramov and Chordia (2005) report 
that a conditional version of the FF model captures the impact of firm-level size and book-to-
market variables but that liquidity and momentum effects (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) remain 
unexplained in all models tested. 
2 While many have valuably asked how risk evolves over time, such research has focused on 
the time-series properties of the returns themselves (Bollerslev et al., 1992; Fraser, 1996), on 
conditional asset pricing models with pre-specified risk factors or conditioning variables 
(Jagannathan and Wang, 1996; Avramov and Chordia, 2005), the time-varying properties of 
given risk factors or risk premia (Priestley, 1997) or the links between economic variables and 
the conditional volatility of stock prices (Sadorsky, 2003) rather than on shifts between different 
sources of risk.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Notwithstanding the finding of Booth and Booth (2003) that the ‘presidential cycle’ in stock 
returns may be captured by business cycle variables. 
4 Jollife (1986) asserts that the presence of heavy-zero data influences the correlation structure 
and the results of the PCA, but there seems to be no criterion by which to define ‘heavy-zero’. 
5 The R2 values reported here are somewhat lower than are often found for the market model, 
and considerably lower than those found by Fama and French (1993) for their time-series 
regressions. However, the variables to be explained by our regressions are not portfolio returns 
but component scores (the loadings do not sum to unity) capturing only part of common risk. 
